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Abstract
The purpose of this chapter is to review the latest developments in corporate income tax 
(CIT) focusing on its international aspects and associated distortions. In this endeavor, 
the chapter draws on evidence provided by the leading tax experts as well as on the 
profound and rigorous research produced by academia. This chapter examines and syn-
thesizes research on tax competition, relationship between tax rates and foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and tax avoidance as a result of differential tax regimes. Trends in the 
development of CIT are discerned using statistical data provided by OECD and European 
Commission. Numerous studies done on global, regional, and country-specific datasets 
support the premise that indeed tax competition for capital exists though the magnitude 
of effects varies. There is also enough evidence that tax avoidance and evasion through 
base erosion and profit shifting persist for some time and may be on the rise.
Keywords: corporate income tax, tax competition, tax avoidance, foreign direct 
investment, multinationals
1. Introduction
Corporate income taxes (CIT) are paid by companies including those operating in several 
countries. Therefore, there is a strong international aspect in its design, administration, and 
compliance. In scientific and professional literature, this aspect is covered under the topics of 
tax competition, tax coordination, and tax harmonization. The scientific interest in interna-
tional tax competition and related topics is not new. The interest is sustained by a rising capi-
tal mobility in the last 40 years and increasing concerns over capital flight and loss of public 
revenue due to base erosion and profit shifting. The problem stems from the dual objectives of 
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the governments. On the one hand, governments seek to attract investment into the country, 
or region, or locality, and therefore offer incentives to potential investors often in the form 
of preferential tax treatment. In doing so, governments engage in harmful or wasteful tax 
competition. On the other hand, governments need to collect enough tax revenue in order to 
provide a sufficient level and quality of public services and fulfill other functions demanded 
by the public. This calls for a rather complicated balancing between those objectives. Loss of 
revenue may lead to suboptimal provision of public services or require difficult policy deci-
sions on the higher level of government or at the supranational level, including tax coordina-
tion and tax harmonization.
Theoretical studies in public economics provide the conditions for the economic effects of tax 
competition to be either harmful or useful [1–3]. Those conditions are varied and often hard 
to reconcile in theoretical models. In empirical research, they lead to inconclusive results. 
Negative economic effects of tax competition include “base erosion” of taxes on mobile fac-
tors of production that ultimately leads to the underprovision of public services and frustrates 
governments’ efforts to redistribute income. The useful effects of tax competition are largely 
supported by the initiators and followers of public choice theory who find in tax competition 
efficiency-increasing effects. It limits the tendency of local governments to overexpansion and 
constrains the growth of a Leviathan state [4, 5]. Empirical literature on tax competition leaves 
us with a similarly diverse picture [1, 3].
This chapter attempts to synthesize growing scholarship on the economic effects of tax com-
petition and includes the review of the latest trends in CIT, foreign direct investment (FDI), 
and profit shifting. The topic is of high relevance since tax avoidance and evasion through 
base erosion and profit shifting continue unabated for some time and may be on the rise due 
to the ever more sophisticated tax-reducing techniques used by multinationals and increas-
ingly mobile individuals [6–10].
The sections that follow will (1) review the theory of tax competition including “basic tax 
competition model” and its extensions, (2) present recent trends in corporate income tax rates 
and revenue in the EU and OECD countries, (3) survey empirical literature on tax competi-
tion, including evidence of the relationship between tax rates and FDI, and (4) outline what 
is known about the magnitude of tax avoidance through base erosion and profit shifting. 
Finally, the last section concludes.
2. Tax competition theory
There is an extensive literature on the theory of tax competition. The modern literature on tax 
competition began with Oates’s discussion on the potential efficiency problems associated 
with competition for capital by local governments [2, 11]. Under certain assumptions, small 
jurisdictions competing for mobile capital reduce tax rates to such level that leads “to less 
than efficient levels of output of local services” ([1] p. 654). In a small jurisdiction, competition 
leads to the abandonment of taxes on capital income altogether which produces “race to the 
bottom” ([1] p. 651). Oates’ concludes that this behavior is inefficient that rests on the idea that 
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this a zero-sum game. When all governments behave this way, none gain and consequently 
communities are all worse off than they would have been if local managers had made deci-
sions based on marginal costs [2]. More recent interest in the topic was prompted in part by 
fears that tax competition among the increasingly economically integrated EU nations will 
over time significantly reduce the level of capital income taxation to the extent of announcing 
the death of CIT [12]. Thus, governments must solely rely on financing their expenditures 
from the taxes on immobile factors of production (labor/land) and on consumption taxes, 
which have their own constraints and disadvantages.
“Basic tax competition model” has been built by Zodrow and Mieszkowski [13] and Wilson 
who formalized the notions on tax competition developed by Oates [2]. Alternatively, the 
model is known as a ZMW model or a simpler version, according to Wilson [2], is known 
as ZM model [14]. Similar to Tiebout’s model [15], the ZM model is built on those assump-
tions “(1) A large number of homogenous jurisdictions; (2) Perfectly competitive markets; 
(3) A Nash equilibrium in which each jurisdiction takes as fixed the after-tax return to 
capital and the tax rates set by other jurisdictions; (4) Fixed population and land in each 
jurisdiction; (5) Identical tastes and incomes for all residents of all jurisdictions; (6) A 
fixed national capital stock that is perfectly mobile across local jurisdictions; (7) A single 
good that is produced by capital and the fixed factor (labor/land) in each jurisdiction; (8) 
Government services that are “publicly provided private goods,” benefit only residents, 
have no spillover effects to other jurisdictions, and can be modeled as purchases of the 
single private good;(9) Two local tax instruments—a “property tax” that applies to capital 
income and a head tax; (10) Local governments that act to maximize the welfare of their 
(identical) residents” ([1, 15] p. 654).
In the ZM model, interjurisdictional competition results in “race to the bottom,” as all taxes 
on capital income are eliminated. Governments are only able to impose taxes on immobile 
factors of production only. The insight of this result serves as a model for a “small open 
economy” [16].
An important assumption of the basic tax competition model is that local public services are 
essentially another consumption good that enters individual utility functions. However, as 
Sinn correctly observes, one of the most important roles of government is to redistribute 
income which has nothing to do with consumption goods [17]. Income redistribution at 
least partially represents social protection against income uncertainty attributable to dif-
ferent macroeconomic shocks and, more broadly, differences in natural endowments and 
access to education. Private markets fail to insure against income uncertainty and other 
risks; therefore, public programs designed to smooth such shocks improve both equity 
and efficiency of resource allocation. Tax competition results in lower tax rates on mobile 
factors of production and thus limits the power of governments to engage in redistribu-
tive activities. It imposes important social costs. In case of perfect mobility of both capital 
and highly skilled labor, tax competition implies that only benefit taxes can be levied and 
the policy of income redistribution is given up. Though Sinn’s observation relaxes one of 
the assumptions of the basic model, it fundamentally reinforces the central message of the 
basic model.
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Since the development of the basic tax competition model, many extensions have been added 
by changing one or several assumptions of the basic model; for complete list and details, see 
Zodrow [1]. Some of those modifications support the results of the basic model and find inef-
ficiencies due to tax competition, while others find efficiency enhancing effects of tax competi-
tion. The extensions that assume heterogeneous rather than homogeneous jurisdictions and 
include trade among members of the union or trade with the rest of the world find harmful 
effects to tax competition. The modification of the model which assumes variable labor supply 
(instead of fixed) also does not change the results of the basic model.
Another departure from the ZM model is the existence of “interregional externalities.” In 
this case, the actions that one region’s government takes to increase the welfare of its own 
residents lead to reductions in the welfare of residents in other regions. In the tax competition 
literature, this externality is often described as a “fiscal externality,” which occurs through the 
effects of one region’s public policies on the government budgets in another region [18]. For 
example, when a region lowers its tax rate on mobile capital, it gains capital at the expense of 
other regions, causing their tax bases to fall and, hence, their tax revenues to decline. Because 
governments are assumed not to possess unlimited taxing powers, the presence of such exter-
nalities reinforces the message of the ZM model (Wilson [2]).
However, other extensions of the basic model, such as the existence of international trade 
with the presence of agglomeration economies [19] and international public good spillovers 
do not support the conclusion of the ZM model. Adding the combination of labor mobility 
and population scale economies to the model yields interesting results. With scale economies, 
underprovision of local public services tends to decline and disappears entirely in the limit-
ing case of a pure public good [1]. Therefore, this extension contradicts the proposition of the 
basic tax competition model.
A special niche in this discussion is reserved for public choice literature, which traditionally 
argues that jurisdictional governments in the union do not act to maximize the welfare of 
their residents but to achieve their own objectives that are typically positively related to the 
size of the budget. Under this view, government bureaucrats strive to maximize the budgets 
of their agencies and increase their own power and prestige. In the public choice literature, 
tax competition is not a source of inefficiency. On the contrary, tax competition serves a valu-
able social purpose in constraining government officials who are naturally predisposed to 
raise revenue to serve their own rather than public interests. To Brennan and Buchanan for 
instance, “… tax competition among separate units … is an objective to be sought in its own 
right” ([4] p. 186). In this context, tax competition plays an important role in limiting budget-
maximizing behavior of government officials. It restricts the growth of public finance and 
curbs the expansion of a Leviathan state.
The results of the tax competition literature are mixed to such a degree that it is difficult to 
draw unambiguous conclusions. It is obvious that the key point of the basic tax competition 
model (as well as those extensions that reinforce its conclusions) is that tax competition is 
harmful and leads to inefficient underprovision of public services. On the other hand, some 
of the extensions to the basic model suggest that tax competition may be desirable as it limits 
the undue expansion of public budgets.
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3. Empirical evidence of tax competition
3.1. Trends in corporate income taxes
As a consequence of the difficulty to develop one and conclusive theory, the empirical lit-
erature on tax competition burgeoned in recent years. However, meta-analysis reveals that 
results are as diverse as those in theoretical analyses [3]. First, the empirical evidence of tax 
competition and “race to the bottom” depend on the choice of parameters. Second, the find-
ings are not conclusive. For example, there is mixed evidence if rate reductions in the face of 
increased international capital mobility are actually occurring. At first glance, the reduction of 
CIT rates is undisputable. CIT statutory rates1 have decreased substantially in the EU over the 
past 22 years, with the average rate falling from 35% in 1995 to 22% in 2017, which constitutes 
a fall of 37.4% from 1995 to 2017 in EU 28 countries [20]. As indicated in Figure 1, the decrease 
of CIT rates in new EU member states (those who joined EU in 2004 and later) is even more 
substantial. The average statutory rates have decreased from the average rate of 31% in 1995 
to 18% in 2017. This constitutes a fall of 43.6% or an average annual rate of minus 3% during 
the same period. In old EU member states (EU-15), statutory rates fell at an average annual 
rate of −2% as shown in Figure 2.
As indicated in Figure 3, in OECD countries combined central and local government, average 
statutory rates have fallen by 25.6% from an average CIT rate of 32.5% in 2000 to an average 
1Statutory, or nominal, tax rates are rates stated in a tax law (statute, code) expressed usually in percentage terms to be 
applied to a tax base, for example, taxable income.
Figure 1. Statutory corporate income tax rates for new EU member states. Source: European Commission. Data on 
Taxation (2017).
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CIT rate of 24.2% in 2017 [21]. The statutory rates have fallen in virtually each OECD member 
state with an exception of Chile where CIT rate has increased by 10% points. The largest fall 
in the CIT statutory rate has occurred in Germany, albeit from a very high level of 52% in 2000 
to 30.2% in 2017, while the change of CIT rate in the United States was incremental (−0.43% 
points).
However, this evidence becomes less remarkable when base-broadening measures2 are taken 
into account leading to much less conspicuous fall in average effective tax rates. As shown 
in Figure 4, average effective tax rates measured as CIT revenue as a % of GDP has stayed 
overall even. They have decreased by 15% from 2000 to 2014 or at an average annual rate of 
−1.12%, with the effects of the economic boom and recession standing out.
These trends support previous findings by Grubert that the greatest declines in tax rates were 
in small, open and relatively poor countries—the countries that are arguably most vulnerable 
to the effects of tax competition, like new EU member states [22]. These results suggest that 
the rate reductions predicted by the theory of tax competition are actually occurring. Indeed, 
governments engage in two-dimensional tax competition. They concurrently compete over 
effective marginal tax rates for capital and over statutory rates for profits [23]. Evidence from 
Belgium suggests of regional tax competition taking place between different regions, with a 
lower effective tax rate (ETR) in the peripheral region of Wallonia than in Flanders [24].
However, it should be noted that reasons other than the tax competition for mobile capital 
might explain the fall in statutory CIT rates. In particular, this result can be explained by 
2Like taxation of previously untaxed items such as short-term capital gains.
Figure 2. Statutory corporate income tax rates for old EU member states (EU-15). Source: European Commission. Data 
on Taxation (2017).
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Figure 3. Statutory corporate income tax rates in OECD countries. Difference from 2000 to 2017. Source: OECD (2017).
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the reforms undertaken by policy makers to adopt base-broadening, rate-reducing measures 
consistent with persisting reform recommendations to improve the efficiency, equity, and 
simplicity of the tax system [25]. Besides, reductions in statutory rates can also be explained 
as an attempt to minimize a country’s vulnerability to the use of transfer pricing by multina-
tional enterprises to move deductions to high-tax countries and receipts to low-tax countries 
[26]. This is consistent with tax avoidance problem caused by capital mobility and tax rate 
differentials discussed in the following sections.
3.2. Tax rates and foreign direct investment
Since the 1980s, the relation between FDI and corporate taxation policy has been widely stud-
ied, and the pioneers in research have focused primarily on the FDI flows sensitivity to capital 
tax rate [3]. Despite abundant literature, the consensus on the effect of the corporate taxation 
on FDI in todays’ globalized economies has not been reached. Some of the studies find no 
impact of tax reduction on FDI, but the other studies argue about the negative relationship 
between taxation policies and FDI gravity.
Hunady and Orviska examine EU countries (except Estonia due to the unavailability of cer-
tain data) in the period between 2004 and 2011 and find no statistically significant effect of 
statutory corporate tax rate on the flow of FDI [27]. Similarly, Kersan-Skabic using data on 
EU transition economies fails to find evidence that tax rates significantly affect the long-run 
elasticity of FDI [28]. Studies of Daniels and Egger based on data from the US and other OECD 
countries basically do not confirm a precise impact of tax rates on the long-run elasticity of 
foreign investment [29, 30].
There exist even fewer studies which find any positive effect of corporate taxes on FDI. Herger 
finds that tax elasticity varies depending on the FDI strategy (with vertical FDI being in gen-
eral more responsive) [31]. Salihu and Faria focus on emerging economies and they show that 
there is a positive relationship between FDI and the avoidance of corporate tax [32, 33]. Their 
research is based on Malaysian companies. The findings indicate that investors seek to avoid 
taxes in both host and parent countries.
The heterogeneity of empirical findings led to a need for concise and comprehensive review 
of the existing empirical evidence. In the meta-analysis undertaken by Feld and Heckemeyer, 
Figure 4. Corporate Income Tax Revenue as percentage of GDP, OECD countries. Source: OECD (2017).
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a pooled effect based on the median result taken from each primary study was found. It 
amounts to semi-elasticity for company taxes on FDI (percentage reaction of FDI to one per-
centage point change in the tax burden) of 1.68 in absolute terms [3].
4. Distortionary effects of differential tax regimes
4.1. Distortionary effects of corporate income tax
As stressed by Cnossen and many others, even confined to the tax system of one country, the 
defects of the corporate income tax are numerous as it causes distortions of asset mix, capital allo-
cation, financing and payout decisions, and the choice of organizational form [1, 34]. The main 
problem with capital taxation is that effective corporate tax and personal tax rates on investment 
returns vary depending on the choice of financing [35]. Investment can be made either through 
equity or debt. As a rule, debt finance is favored against equity finance because interest payments 
are deductible under most tax systems. The tax-favored status of debt discriminates against cor-
porations that face difficulties in attracting debt [35]. Therefore, newly founded corporations 
have to sustain higher capital costs because of taxation than older, established corporations with 
either easier access to debt financing or sufficient retained profits to finance new investments.
The corporation’s dividend policy produces yet another example of discrimination. Profits can 
be either distributed to shareholders as dividends or retained. When earnings are retained, 
the shareholders, instead of receiving dividends, benefit from an increase in the market value 
of the company. As a result of this bias in favor of retentions, equity funds may be locked in 
within certain companies rather than allocated between companies in the most efficient man-
ner by financial markets [36]. Broadly, debt finance is favored against equity finance, and indi-
vidual investors are discriminated relative to corporate investors. Therefore, differential tax 
rates and other tax structure features inherent to CIT distort investment decisions that should 
be based solely on economic costs and gains. Those features produce worldwide implications 
through the operations of multinationals.
4.2. Tax avoidance
As shown in Figure 5, OECD member states have widely diverging statutory CIT rates 
that may have externality effects on other member states. Statutory rates vary from 8.5% in 
Switzerland to 35% in the United States.
Different tax regimes have a direct bearing on tax avoidance. The main difference between 
tax evasion and tax avoidance is usually illegality of the former. Avoidance usually implies 
using and somewhat bending the tax laws in order to pay the least possible amount of taxes. 
It covers a broad range of behaviors. One example is to pay a tax professional to alert one to 
the deductibility of income earned from already undertaken activities. Another example is to 
change the legal form of a given behavior, such as reorganizing a business from one form of 
corporation to another, recharacterizing ordinary income as capital income or retiming the 
transaction to alter the tax year it falls under [37].
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International investors often have at their disposal numerous alternative methods of structur-
ing and financing their investments, arranging transactions between related parties located in 
different countries and returning profits to investors. Sophisticated international tax avoid-
ance typically entails reallocating taxable income from countries with high-tax rates to coun-
tries with low-tax rates and may also include the changing the timing of income recognition 
for tax purposes. Since interest, as a rule, is tax deductible while dividends are taxed, it is 
beneficial for the companies to use debt to finance foreign affiliates in high-tax countries and 
to use equity to finance affiliates in low-tax countries [8]. Another vehicle to reduce taxation of 
passive income is the use of hybrid entities or hybrid instruments that are treated differently 
in different jurisdictions. A new regulation has been introduced in the late 1990s in the USA 
with an intention to simplify questions of whether a firm was a corporation or a partnership. 
The application of the rule to foreign circumstances has led to a situation where an entity can 
be recognized as a corporation by one jurisdiction but not by another. For example, a US par-
ent’s subsidiary in a low-tax country can lend to its subsidiary in a high-tax country, with the 
interest deductible because the high-tax country recognizes the firm as a separate corporation. 
Figure 5. Statutory corporate income tax rates of the OECD countries in 2017 (in %). Source: OECD, 2017.
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There are also hybrid instruments that can avoid taxation by being treated as debt in one 
jurisdiction and equity in another [8].
The empirical evidence is broadly consistent with these incentives. The reported profitabil-
ity of multinational firms is inversely related to local tax rates, a relationship that is at least 
partly the consequence of tax-motivated debt financing (thin capitalization)3, the pricing of 
intrafirm transfers, royalty payments4 and other such methods. Grubert estimates separate 
equations for dividend, interest, and royalty payments by foreign subsidiaries to American 
parent companies and finds that high corporate tax rates in countries in which American sub-
sidiaries are located are correlated with higher interest payments and lower dividend payout 
rates [22]. Patterns of reported profitability are consistent with other indicators of aggressive 
tax avoidance behavior. It is widely accepted that firms adjust prices used for within-firm 
transactions with the goal of reducing their total tax obligations. There is substantial evidence 
of tax-motivated transfer pricing in US trade prices. Multinational firms typically benefit by 
reducing prices charged by affiliates in high-tax prices for items and services provided to 
affiliates in low-tax countries [7, 38]. Prior research has found significant effects of tax rates 
in affiliate and parent countries on the profit shifting behavior of multinational entities; how-
ever, the magnitude of the effects varies. The results measured in semi-elasticities range from 
close to zero to well above one [39].
The findings of the research based on the profit shifting behavior by US multinationals are 
supported by European evidence. Weichenrieder using data on German inbound and out-
bound FDI finds an empirical correlation between the home country tax rate of a parent and 
the net of tax profitability of its German affiliate that is consistent with profit shifting behav-
ior. The result suggests that a 10% point increase in the parent’s home country tax rate leads 
to roughly half a percentage point increase in the profitability of the German subsidiary [40]. 
Using a unique dataset containing detailed firm-level information on the parent companies 
and subsidiaries of European multinationals, Huizinga and Laeven build a model and empiri-
cally examine the extent of intra-European profit shifting by European multinationals. On 
average, they find a semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to the top statutory tax rate 
of 1.3, while shifting costs are estimated to be 0.6% of the tax base. They come to the conclu-
sion that international profit shifting leads to a substantial redistribution of national corporate 
tax revenues [41]. Evidence of income shifting in response to differences in corporate tax rates 
and the substantial loss of revenues from a unilateral increase in the corporate tax rate is also 
supported by the research by using data on a large selection of OECD countries [42].
The exception to the findings that support the central message of the basic tax competition 
model is the paper by Han and Leach who develop a model in which competing govern-
ments offer financial incentives to induce individual firms to locate within their jurisdictions 
[43]. Equilibrium is described under three specifications of the supplementary taxes. There 
3Thin or hidden capitalization of a subsidiary arises when a foreign investor substitutes foreign debt capital for equity 
capital, particularly in cases where debt financing exhibits some of the characteristics of equity and the debt is owed to 
a related lender. (Shome, 1995)
4Withholding rates on cross-border interest and royalty payments are (which vary by class of payer and payee and by the 
financial instrument—in itself a source tax arbitrage) very low. (Cnossen, 2003)
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is no misallocation of capital under two of these specifications, and there might or might 
not be capital misallocation under the third. This result contrasts strongly with the basic tax 
competition model which finds that competition among governments almost always leads to 
inefficient allocation of resources.
International tax avoidance is evidently a successful activity. Very little tax is paid on the 
foreign source income of US firms [8]. This has grave implications for domestic tax policy. 
“The international mobility of economic activity now dramatically reduces the ability to tax 
domestic income-producing activity too heavily. Indeed, the importance of this consideration 
raises the very real question of whether any longer exists such a thing as purely domestic tax 
policy” ([38] p. 319). It is really another way of saying that greater tax coordination between 
countries may be an answer to this international problem.
4.3. The revenue loss estimates of base erosion and profit shifting (BEPS)
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, and the fiscal problems that followed in many 
countries, the public and policy makers paid greater attention to the tax avoidance of multi-
national companies. Similarly, researchers devoted greater efforts to estimating the scale and 
nature of the associated tax losses.
Corporate tax is an important source of government revenue in all regions of the world. As 
shown in Figure 6, though there is an annual fluctuation, on average in the OECD govern-
ments raise around 10% of their total tax revenue from CIT, which is approximately 3% of 
GDP [44]. CIT accounts for a larger share of total tax revenues on average in lower-income 
countries than in high-income countries [6].
Making estimates of the global losses due to base erosion and profit shifting requires com-
plex and rigorous research. Currently, the most comprehensive studies available are from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) researchers Crivelli et al. and Cobham and Janský 
whose study has been recently published by the United Nations University World Institute 
for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) in Helsinki [6, 9, 45].
Using panel data for 173 countries over 33 years, Crivelli et al. examine the magnitude and 
features of international fiscal externalities. In particular, they focus on the spillovers from tax 
policy decisions in individual jurisdictions onto others. They develop and use an innovative 
method allowing a distinction between spillover effects through real investment decisions 
Figure 6. Taxes on corporate income as percentage of total taxation, OECD average. Source: OECD, 2017.
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and through avoidance techniques and quantify the revenue losses through the latter. In total, 
they estimate global revenue losses at around US$650 billion annually, of which around one-
third relate to developing countries. The concentration as a share of gross domestic product 
(GDP) is somewhat higher in developing countries compared to OECD economies [45].
Cobham and Gibson combine this finding with data on the relatively greater reliance on cor-
porate tax revenue in developing countries to show that the estimated losses are around 2–3% 
of total tax revenue in OECD countries, but 6–13% in developing countries [46].
Applying a methodology developed by researchers at the International Monetary Fund to an 
improved dataset Cobhan and Jansky estimate revenue losses of around US$500 billion per 
year globally [6]. Though the largest losses are suffered by rich economies such as the United 
States, relative losses are more intensive in lower-income countries. While any estimates of 
this intentionally hidden phenomenon are necessarily uncertain, the size of magnitude sug-
gests that the economic development of countries may in some cases be substantially dam-
aged by the activities of multinational companies.
In country-specific research, Clausing using Bureau of Economic Analysis survey data on 
US multinational corporations during 1983–2012 finds that profit shifting is likely costing 
the US government between $77 billion and $111 billion in corporate tax revenue by 2012, 
and these revenue losses have increased substantially in recent years [7]. Those findings are 
corroborated by other researchers who estimate that the US tax losses from profit shifting of 
multinational firms may approach or even exceed $100 billion per year [8].
However, accumulated losses are staggering. Recent estimates show that Fortune 500 corpo-
rations are avoiding up to $767 billion in US federal income taxes by holding more than $2.6 
trillion of “permanently reinvested” profits offshore. In their latest annual financial reports, 
29 of these corporations reveal that they have paid an income tax rate of 10% or less in coun-
tries where these profits are officially held, indicating that most of these profits are likely in 
offshore tax havens [47].
This might be viewed as evidence that lowering corporate tax rates is an effective tool against 
avoidance. Narrower studies, however, such as the studies by Cobham and Janský (2017) and 
Clausing [7] provide evidence that profit shifting has grown strongly even as effective tax rates 
have fallen. Cobham and Janský (2017) document effective tax rates for US-headquartered 
multinationals of 0–5% in the major misalignment jurisdictions to which most profit is shifted, 
compared to 15–20% in the USA and other economies on average [6].
5. Conclusions
The survey of the literature in this chapter suggests that tax competition and related problems 
remain high on the agenda of policy makers as well as researchers. Since governments have 
the dual mission to attract investment into their jurisdiction and collect enough public rev-
enue to provide public services, the tensions arise. In order to encourage FDI and other forms 
of investment, the governments offer tax incentives to potential investors. However, that often 
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means engaging in harmful competition with other jurisdictions. Such behavior is inefficient 
because it is a zero-sum game. When all governments behave this way, none gain and con-
sequently communities are all worse off than they would have been if public managers had 
made decisions based on marginal costs. The tax competition may reduce tax revenues and 
lead to inefficient underprovision of public services.
The recent empiric evidence supports the central message of basic tax competition theory that 
competition for capital is actually occurring. It is manifested through the overall reduction 
in statutory and effective corporate income tax rates as well as sensitivity of FDI to tax bur-
den. However, in addition to distortions in capital allocation arising from genuine productive 
activities, the differential tax regimes create other distortions, like tax arbitrage and tax avoid-
ance by multinational companies. Governments throughout the world incur significant rev-
enue losses through base erosion and profit shifting. Recent estimates show that accumulated 
losses for some countries are staggering and reach $767 billion in US federal income taxes [47].
The magnitude of revenue losses due to tax avoidance by multinational companies and other 
distortions arising from differential tax regimes call for the re-examination of CIT policies and 
tax coordination, and/or harmonization at the international level.
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